CERTIFICATE OF SALE August 11, 2009 (2024)

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VENICE PARK HOLDINGS LP vs MOORE, DEBI

Jul 18, 2024 |QUARTERMAINE, ERIKA N. |Evictions Residential Non-Monetary (South County) |Evictions Residential Non-Monetary (South County) |2024 CC 004762 SC

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RUBI, ANA I vs RUBI, PEDRO J

Jul 26, 2024 |DENKIN, DAVID LEE |Evictions Residential Non-Monetary |Evictions Residential Non-Monetary |2024 CC 004946 NC

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HAMSHER, SCOTT G vs THOMAS, KEVIN

Jul 25, 2024 |UZABEL, MARYANN OLSON |Evictions Residential Non-Monetary |Evictions Residential Non-Monetary |2024 CC 004906 NC

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CEAI LAKES AT NORTH PORT LLC vs MEADOWS, SCOTT

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STINGU BARTOS, OLGA vs MARTIN, CHRISTINA MARIE

Jul 22, 2024 |HANKIN, SHANNON |Evictions Residential Non-Monetary (South County) |Evictions Residential Non-Monetary (South County) |2024 CC 004813 SC

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PARKER HOUSE PROPERTIES INC vs SEELEY, FELICIA

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Ruling

Portillo VS Cornejo

Jul 26, 2024 |Civil Unlimited (Other Real Property (not emin...) |RG20071794

RG20071794: Portillo VS Cornejo 07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses and Sanctions in Department 22Tentative Ruling - 07/23/2024 Brad SeligmanThe Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses filed by Ligia Portillo on 07/01/2024 isGranted.Plaintiffs Ligia Portillo, Leonor Martinez, Gloria Ortiz, Andres Sanchez and Luis Trujillo’s(“Plaintiffs”) Unopposed Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (SetOne), Request for Production (Set One), and Request for Production (Set Two) and for sanctionsis GRANTED in its entirety.Defendant Ana M. Cornejo (“Defendant”) is ordered to provide further code-compliantresponses to the discovery identified above within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order.Defendant is further ordered to provide Plaintiffs’ counsel with three dates that are before August30th, 2024, on which she agrees to appear for deposition. These dates shall be provided withinfive (5) days of the date of this Order.If no agreeable dates prior to August 30, 2024 are provided within five (5) days of the date ofthis Order to Plaintiffs’ counsel, Defendant shall appear for a properly noticed deposition on anydate to be unilaterally chosen by Plaintiffs’ counsel.Sanctions in the amount of $800 are imposed on Defendant (not on Defendant’s counsel).The Court additionally issues an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) as to why terminating sanctionsshould not be imposed. The hearing on the OSC is set for Friday October 4, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. inDepartment 22.Any papers that the parties wish to have considered at the OSC shall be filed and served on laterthan fourteen (14) days before the OSC hearing. At the OSC, the Court will also considerwhether Defendant has appeared for her deposition prior to August 30, 2024 and whether code-compliant discovery responses (and any corresponding production of documents) have beentimely served on Plaintiffs.HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING?THROUGH eCOURTNotify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before thescheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps:1. Log into eCourt Public Portal2. Case Search3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search” SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG20071794: Portillo VS Cornejo 07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses and Sanctions in Department 224. Select the Case Name5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling”7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting8. Select “Proceed”BY EMAILSend an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK (dept22@alameda.courts.ca.gov) and all the otherparties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit thedepartment clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely.Notice via BOTH eCourt AND email is required. The tentative ruling will become the ruling ofthe court if no party contests the tentative ruling.

Ruling

AGAPITO VS. NACELLI

Jul 19, 2024 |MSC22-00125

MSC22-00125CASE NAME: AGAPITO VS. NACELLI*HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENSFILED BY:*TENTATIVE RULING:*Before the Court is Defendant Tina Paclebar’s Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens.Factual BackgroundPlaintiffs allege that they met with Defendant Joseph Nacelli in July 2009 to discuss their desire topurchase real property located at 761 Mariposa Ave. in Rodeo, California (“Property”). As Plaintiffsdid not qualify for a mortgage, they wanted to have Defendant Nacelli hold title to the Property intrust for them. At that time, Mr. Nacelli was living rent-free with Plaintiffs. In return, Plaintiffs agreedthey would make the down payment for the Property and pay all costs related to the Property,including property taxes, insurance, and maintenance and repair costs. Defendant Nacelli agreed tothese terms.On July 1, 2009, title to the Property was transferred to Mr. Nacelli, per the terms of the aboveagreement. Plaintiffs used Josephine Agapito’s sister, Elizabeth Monsanto, as their real estate agent.Plaintiffs, not Mr. Nacelli, paid into escrow the down payment for the Property. Since that time, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024Plaintiffs have paid the mortgage, paid for all upkeep of the Property, and have rented the Propertyto family members of Plaintiff Arnel Agapito.Mr. Nacelli never moved into the Property, but instead continued to live rent-free with Plaintiffs until2017 when he voluntarily moved out. Mr. Nacelli admits he never paid any expenses related to theProperty, nor had anything to do with maintaining the Property. However, in December 2021, Mr.Nacelli sold the Property to Defendant Tina Paclebar – without consulting with or informing Plaintiffs.Defendant Paclebar is the long-term domestic partner of Defendant Jane Nacelli – who is PlaintiffJosephine Agapito’s (and Defendant Joseph Nacelli’s) sister. Ms. Paclebar has been considered ‘partof the family’ to the Agapito’s for over 15 years. She has been invited to family holidays and events.The Property was never put up for sale to the general public. Instead, the Property was sold to Ms.Paclebar for $365,000. The closing statement for the sale, however, indicates that Mr. Nacelli ‘gifted’$154,163.43 of that amount to Ms. Paclebar.Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit on January 24, 2022. They allege a number of causes of actionagainst Mr. Nacelli, including fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. They also allege causes of actionaimed at nullifying the sale of the Property, including quiet title, constructive trust, and fraudulentconveyance. Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Paclebar knew, or should have known, that Mr. Nacelli was notthe rightful owner of the Property, and was not authorized to sell it. Ms. Paclebar contends she is abona fide purchaser of value for the Property, and had no knowledge of the alleged agreementbetween Plaintiffs and Mr. Nacelli.Legal Standard“[A] lis pendens is recorded by someone asserting a real property claim, to give notice that a lawsuithas been filed which may, if that person prevails, affect title to or possession of the real propertydescribed in the notice.” (Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Charlton (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1069,citing CCP §§ 405.2, 405.4, 405.20.) Under Code Civ. Proc. § 405.30, at any time after a notice ofpendency of action has been recorded, any party with an interest in the real property may apply tothe Court to expunge the notice.“The expungement statutes provide that a lis pendens may be expunged on three grounds: (1) ‘thepleading on which the notice is based does not contain a real property claim’ (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 405.31); (2) ‘the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probablevalidity of the real property claim’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32); or (3) ‘adequate relief can be secured tothe claimant by the giving of an undertaking’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.33).” (Carr v. Rosien (2015) 238Cal.App.4th 845, 857.) Probable validity is met when the Plaintiff establishes her claim by apreponderance of the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32.)The party prevailing on an expungement motion must be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costsincurred in making or opposing the motion unless the court finds the other party acted with“substantial justification” or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of attorney fees and costs“unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.38.) SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024Overview of Issues and Arguments Real Property ClaimInitially, it is uncontested that Plaintiff’s complaint involves a real property claim. Those claims includethe claims for quiet title, constructive trust, and fraudulent conveyance. Probable Validity of Plaintiff’s ClaimsNext, the Court considers the merits of the claim. “‘ “If the claimant does plead a real property claim,but the claim pleaded has no evidentiary merit, the lis pendens must be expunged upon motionunder [Code of Civil Procedure §] 405.32.” ’ [Citation.]” (La Jolla Group II v. Bruce (2012) 211Cal.App.4th 461, 475; see also Amalgamated Bank v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1003,1011-1012.) Under section 405.32, “the court shall order that the notice be expunged if the courtfinds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validityof the real property claim.” “Probable validity” means “it is more likely than not that the [plaintiff] willobtain a judgment against the defendant on the claim.” (Code of Civil Procedure §405.3.) Plaintiffa*gain has the burden on this issue and must present evidence showing it is likely to prevail on the realproperty claim. Defendant’s PositionDefendant argues that she is a bona fide purchaser for value of the Property. “A bona fide purchaserfor value “is one who pays value for the property without notice of any adverse interest or of anyirregularity in the sale proceedings.” (Melendrez v. D & I Investments, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th1238, 1250 quoting Nguyen v. Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 442.) “The elements of bona fidepurchase are payment of value, in good faith, and without actual or constructive notice of another’srights.” (Id. at 1251 citations omitted.) “Thus, the two elements of being a BFP are that the buyer (1)purchase the property in good faith for value, and (2) have no knowledge or notice of asserted rightsof another.” (Ibid.)“The first element does not require that the buyer’s consideration be the fair market value of theproperty (or anything approaching it.) [citation] Instead, the buyer need only part with something ofvalue in exchange for the property.” (Ibid.) “The second element required to establish BFP status isthat the buyer have neither knowledge nor notice of the competing claim.” (Ibid.)Defendant presents evidence that the recorded grant deeds for the Property showing title transferredto Joseph Nacelli on July 1, 2009, and then from Mr. Nacelli to Defendant Tina Paclebar on December17, 2021. (Brink Decl. Exs. A-B.) There are no other recorded documents showing any other ownershipinterest in the Property by any other person, including Plaintiffs. In addition, when DefendantPaclebar purchased the Property Mr. Nacelli executed the purchase agreement as well as aHomeowner’s Policy of Title Insurance Affidavit. (Paclebar Decl. Exs. A-B.) By executing thesedocuments, Mr. Nacelli warranted that he was the owner of the Property and was unaware of any SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024liens or encumbrances on the Property.Defendant Paclebar also submits a declaration which states that, prior to the close of escrow, she“was never informed either verbally or in writing, that Joseph Nacelli did not have authority to sell methe Property, or that there was a verbal agreement between Joseph Nacelli and Plaintiffs concerningownership of the Property.” (Paclebar Decl. ¶ 10.)Thus, Defendant argues, that as the recorded documents only showed the Mr. Nacelli owned theProperty, Mr. Nacelli indicated in multiple documents that he was the owner, and Mrs. Paclebarclaims that she was never informed of any claims of ownership of the Property by Plaintiffs, she is abona fide purchaser for value. Plaintiffs’ PositionPlaintiffs dispute the claim that Ms. Paclebar had no knowledge of the arrangement they had withMr. Nacelli regarding their true ownership of the Property and the fact that Mr. Nacelli was merelyholding title on their behalf. They present evidence that Mr. Nacelli confirms that he was merelyholding title in their name, and that he never paid any money for the Property and had no realconnection to the Property. Mr. Nacelli testified as much: Q. So you never paid a cent for the Mariposa property; is that accurate? A. Yes. Q. And you never lived there; is that correct? A. Yes, that’s correct. Q. And you never received any income from the property; is that correct? A. Yes, that’s correct. Q. You merely put your name on the title for the plaintiffs; is that correct? A. Yes, that’s correct. … (Nacelli Depo. at 42:13-23.)Thus, Mr. Nacelli was aware that when he put the Property into his name, he was not doing so as the‘real’ or equitable owner, but was only the named or ‘paper’ title owner holding the Property onbehalf of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs acknowledge that Mr. Nacelli asserts that Plaintiffs breached the aboveagreement – apparently by allowing the Property to go into foreclosure on two occasions. (NacelliDepo. 42:21-48:4.) There were discussions between the parties during this time, and Plaintiffseventually fixed the foreclosure issues. (Ibid.) Since Plaintiffs addressed the issues, and ultimatelystarted making all necessary payments on the Property again, Mr. Nacelli confirmed he wascontinuing to hold title to the Property on behalf of Plaintiffs: Q. And then because they fixed [the foreclosure issues], you continued to hold title in your name but for [Plaintiffs] Josephine and Arnel; is that correct? A. Yes. (Nacelli Depo at 48:5-8.)Plaintiffs also dispute the claim that Ms. Paclebar had no knowledge of the above agreement, or the SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024fact that Plaintiffs were the owners-in-fact of the Property. While not technically a part of the family,Plaintiffs explain that Ms. Paclebar has been treated as such for over 15 years. She has been the long-term partner of Jane Nacelli – the sister of Joseph Nacelli and Plaintiff Josephine Agapito. (ArnelAgapito Decl. ¶ 2.) She has visited Plaintiffs’ house on numerous holidays over the years. (Id. ¶ 14.)Plaintiffs make clear that during these get togethers, both Plaintiffs specifically told Ms. Paclebar thatthey owned the Property. (Ibid.) Specifically, Arnel Agapito’s declaration states: “During these familyget-togethers, on more than one occasion, my wife and I told Defendant Tina Nacelli that we ownedthe Mariposa Property.” (Agapito Decl. ¶ 14.) Defendant’s ReplyOn Reply, Defendant refutes a number of the key statements in Mr. Agapito’s declaration – by citingto Mr. Agapito’s own deposition testimony. First, Defendant disputes the claim that Mr. Agapito hadan agreement (or personally knew about and agreement) with Mr. Nacelli wherein he would benamed the owner of the Property but would hold title for the benefit of Plaintiffs. Second, Defendantchallenges the claim that Mr. Agapito told Defendant Paclebar about this alleged agreement.Specifically, with regard to supposed agreement between Plaintiffs and Mr. Nacelli, Mr. Agapitotestified at his deposition as follows: Q. We touched on this earlier, but you personally never had a verbal agreement with Joseph [Nacelli] regarding him being on title to the Mariposa property to be held in trust for you or your wife; true? A. True. Q. If there was such a conversation, it was between your wife and Joseph; right? A. If -- if there was, it would be between Joseph and my wife. Yeah. (Agapito Depo. at 36:25-37:8.)Defendant contends the above testimony undermines the statements in the Agapito Declarationwhich state that Mr. and Mrs. Agapito had conversations with Mr. Nacelli regarding the arrangementand that Mr. Agapito has direct knowledge of the agreement. (See Agapito Decl. ¶¶ 4-7.)Defendant also takes issue with the declaration’s statement that “my wife and I told Defendant TinaNacelli (sic) that we owned the Mariposa Property.” (Agapito Decl. ¶ 14.) Defendant points out thatMr. Agapito’s deposition testimony is just the opposite: Q. Did you ever personally ever tell Tina that your wife and Joseph had reached a verbal agreement concerning the Mariposa property? A. No. … Q. Right. My question is a little more to the point. How do you know what Tina knows regarding any agreement between Joseph and your wife regarding any agreement between Joseph and your wife regarding the Mariposa property? How do you know SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024 that? A. I don’t know. Q. You don’t know; right? A. I don’t know. I’m just speculating. (Agapito Depo. at 39:24-40:2; 68:1-7.)More specifically, Mr. Agapito testified at deposition that he “never had any conversation to -- to Tinaregarding the property.” (Id. at 79:13-21.)Thus, Mr. Agapito testified at deposition that (1) he never had an agreement with Mr. Nacelli, (2) hecan only speculate that Mrs. Agapito had an agreement with Mr. Nacelli, and (3) he never spoke toMrs. Paclebar regarding that alleged agreement.Defendant also submits deposition testimony from Mr. Nacelli confirming that he never toldDefendant Paclebar that he was not the true owner of the Property. (Nacelli Depo. at 31:22-32:15.)Essentially, on reply Defendant refutes any argument that she had any actual notice of the allegeagreement between Plaintiffs and Mr. Nacelli regarding title to the Property.AnalysisAs noted above, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges real property claims. Thus, thefocus of the Court’s inquiry relates to whether Plaintiffs has established by a preponderance of theevidence the probable validity of the real property claim. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 405.32.)It is undisputed that the recorded chain of title for the Property indicates that Mr. Nacelli was theowner of the Property from July 1, 2009 until December 17, 2021, when title was transferred toDefendant Paclebar. Plaintiffs’ general theory of their case is that Mr. Nacelli was holding theProperty in trust for them, and that Defendant Paclebar knew this to be the case. They allege anumber of different causes of action which all rely upon this general theory.Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Mr. Nacelli did not actually own the Property, but was merelyholding title in his name for the benefit of Plaintiffs. In fact, Mr. Nacelli admitted as much during hisdeposition. While Mr. Nacelli testified that he ‘believed’ that Plaintiffs’ breached their agreement – healso testified that they fixed any breach by remedying the foreclosure proceedings and continuing tomake payments on the mortgage. (Nacelli Depo at 48:5-8, quoted above.) Even if there were sometime limit discussed as to when Plaintiffs would transfer title into their name, there is no explanationas to why any breach of that term would result in actual title of the Property being conveyed to Mr.Nacelli.While Defendant cites to the representations made by Mr. Nacelli in, for example, the Homeowner’sPolicy of Title Insurance Affidavit that he was the true ‘owner’ of the Property, Plaintiffs allege fraudand breach of fiduciary duty causes of action against Mr. Nacelli that address these representations.Mr. Nacelli’s own testimony appears to undermine his representations made in these documents.While this evidence supports their claims against Mr. Nacelli, the main focus of the instant motion SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024relates to what Defendant Paclebar was aware of – or should have been aware of.Plaintiffs evidence regarding Defendant Paclebar’s knowledge of the agreement between Plaintiffsand Mr. Nacelli appeared convincing on first blush. Plaintiffs show that Defendant Paclebar is not adistant third-party to parties to this litigation. While she is not legally a member of the family, she hasbeen the long-term partner of the sister of the two main parties to the agreement – i.e. Plaintiff Mrs.Agapito and Defendant Nacelli. She has attended numerous family holidays over the years. Mr.Agapito, in his declaration in support of the opposition, affirmatively states that “my wife and I toldDefendant Tina Nacelli (sic) that we owned the Mariposa Property,” during these family events.That statement, however, turns out to be false. As outlined above, Mr. Agapito testified in hisdeposition that (1) he personally did not have an agreement with Mr. Nacelli regarding taking title tothe Property for the benefit of Plaintiffs, (2) he had no personal knowledge about any such agreementbetween his wife and Mr. Nacelli, and (3) he never personally told Defendant Paclebar that such anagreement existed. The statements in Mr. Agapito’s declaration were the sole basis for evidencingthat Ms. Paclebar had knowledge of the alleged agreement between Plaintiffs and Mr. Nacelli. “But adeclaration may not contradict factual admissions made in a deposition.” (Arnold v. Dignity Health(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 412, 419 fn. 4 citations omitted.)As courts have made clear, in the context of summary judgment motions, a “party cannot evadesummary judgment by submitted a declaration contradicting his own prior deposition testimony.”(Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1120 citations omitted; see also Best RestMotel, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 969, 708-09, citing Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th482, 500, fn. 12 [“A party cannot create a triable issue of fact by providing a declaration thatcontradicts its prior deposition testimony.”]) The rationale behind this rule applies in the currentsituation.It is notable that Plaintiffs failed to submit a declaration by Mrs. Agapito – who Mr. Agapito indicateswas the party that allegedly had conversations with Mr. Nacelli and Mrs. Paclebar regarding theProperty. Instead, they attempt to have Mr. Agapito’s declaration evidence Mrs. Agapito’sknowledge. It is clear from Mr. Agapito’s deposition testimony, however, that he does not havepersonal knowledge of any agreement with Mr. Nacelli, nor of any discussions with Ms. Paclebarregarding this alleged agreement.“A bona fide purchaser for value “is one who pays value for the property without notice of anyadverse interest or of any irregularity in the sale proceedings.” (Melendrez, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at1250.) Plaintiffs have failed to provide any admissible and credible evidence showing that Mrs.Paclebar had any knowledge of the alleged agreement between Mr. Nacelli and Mrs. Agapitoregarding the Property.As for paying value, Plaintiffs concede that the Property was sold for $365,000, and that Ms. Paclebarpaid approximately $211,000 after the gift from Mr. Nacelli of roughly $154,000. They contend,without evidence, that this is ‘below market.’ Even if that is the case, a bone fide purchaser “need SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024only part with something of value in exchange for the property,” and that amount need not “be thefair market value of the property (or anything approaching it.)” (Melendrez, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at1251.)Under section 405.32, “the court shall order that the notice be expunged if the court finds that theclaimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the realproperty claim.” “Probable validity” means “it is more likely than not that the [plaintiff] will obtain ajudgment against the defendant on the claim.” (Code of Civil Procedure §405.3.)Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden. As such,Defendant Paclebar’s motion to expunge the lis pendens is granted.Attorney FeesCalifornia Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38 provides: The court shall direct that the party prevailing on [a motion to expunge a lis pendens] be awarded the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court finds that the other party acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of attorney’s fees and costs unjust.Plaintiff contends that their recording of the lis pendens was not frivolous and as such attorney’s feesand costs should be denied, citing a couple of unpublished federal district opinions. (Opp. at 12:25-13:4.) Such decisions are “neither binding nor controlling on matters of state law.” (T.H. v. NovartisPharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 175.)Plaintiffs have made no showing that they ‘acted with substantial justification.’ Instead, it appears tobe quite the opposite. Plaintiffs’ opposition relies upon statements in Mr. Agapito’s supportingdeclaration, made under penalty of perjury, which are directly contradicted by his earlier depositiontestimony. They fail to provide any admissible evidence showing that Ms. Paclebar had knowledge ofthe alleged agreement between Mrs. Agapito and Mr. Nacelli.Based on the above, the Court finds that attorney fees are properly awarded to Defendant in theamount of $4,675.

Ruling

HAMID REZA MIRSHOJAE, ET AL. VS 5975-5999 TOPANGA CANYON BLVD LLC, ET AL.

Jul 26, 2024 |21STCV37556

Case Number: 21STCV37556 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: F43 Dept. F43 Date: 7-26-24 Case #21STCV37556, Hamid Reza Mirshojae, et al. vs. 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd LLC, et al. Trial Date: N/A MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Hamid Reza Mirshojae and Woodland Hills Medical Clinic II, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd, LLC and Ahang Mirshojae RELIEF REQUESTED Plaintiffs are requesting attorney fees in the amount of $619,675, plus $17,036.01 in costs, from Defendants. RULING: Motion for attorney fees is granted at a reduced amount. No costs will be awarded at this time. SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiff Hamid Reza Mirshojae (Hamid) and Defendant Ahang Zarin Mirshojae (Ahang) were formerly married and were engaged in extensive litigation against each other prior to 2017. The assets in dispute were in excess of $20 million. At mediation, Hamid and Ahang entered a complex settlement agreement. Immediately after, Hamid alleges that Ahang breached the settlement agreement, and he was forced to incur attorney fees to enforce various terms of the agreement. Eventually, Hamid filed the current suit to enforce the settlement agreement on October 12, 2021. Ahang accused Hamid and his counsel of inducing her to sign the settlement agreement and sued him for $7 million in damages. This Court eventually struck Ahangs complaint based on Plaintiffs anti-SLAPP motion and determined that Ahang was a vexatious litigant. After this ruling, Ahang attempted to disqualify Hamids lead counsel, though that motion was rejected. Hamid alleges that he has incurred significant legal fees over the course of this litigation. Finally, after two years of litigation, the parties settled via a 998 Offer on November 17, 2023. The 998 Offer required Defendants to pay Plaintiffs $270,000 and reasonable fees and costs as determined by the Court. Plaintiffs are requesting attorney fees pursuant to the part of the 998 Offer that allows for reasonable fees to be paid. Plaintiffs are requesting $619,675 in attorney fees from Defendants. Plaintiffs argue in their motion that the attorney fees and hourly rates are reasonable. Plaintiffs evidence in support of their request for attorney fees included a declaration from their attorney, Christopher Beatty, and billing statements (with some redactions) that show which attorney worked on a task, what the task was, and how much time was spent on the task. (Beatty Decl., Ex. H.) The Beatty Declaration also includes a table which shows the hourly rates of the attorneys who worked on the case and their hourly rates at different times. (Beatty Decl., ¶ 35.) Christopher Beattys hourly rates were $950 (for 2.5 hours in 2021), $975 (for 19.2 hours in 2022), and $1,300 (for 1.5 hours in 2022 and 71.6 hours in 2023). Tami K. Sims hourly rate was $1,115 (for 83.4 hours in 2023). Trevor T. Garneys hourly rate was $955 (for 87.8 hours in 2023). Arron J. Paks hourly rate was $705 (for 277.3 hours in 2023). Minh-Van Dos hourly rates were $795 (for 0.5 hours in 2021) and $840 (for 76.1 hours in 2022). Benjamin Mandels hourly rate was $595 (for 89.6 hours in 2022). Finally, Scarlet Speakmores hourly rate was $350 (for 38.8 hours in 2022). The total lodestar was calculated by multiplying each of these attorneys hourly rate by their hours worked then adding them all together. The total hours worked for the attorneys totaled 748.3. The total lodestar amount, as previously noted, is $619,675. Plaintiffs have also requested costs in the amount $17,036.01. However, costs are awarded pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700. If Plaintiffs wish to request costs, Plaintiffs should file a memorandum of costs at the appropriate time. Defendants Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Keith M. Maziarek: Sustained: Entire Declaration (irrelevant), Paragraph 11 Overruled: None Plaintiffs Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of June D. Coleman and the Declaration of Raffi Kassabian: The individual evidentiary objections presented by Plaintiffs to these two declarations are not consecutively numbered. Typically, when written objections to evidence are filed, the written objection must be number consecutively. (See Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1354 (applies to written objections to evidence for summary judgment motions).) While Plaintiffs listed them by paragraph number from the declarations, this is not necessarily effective, because in some instances Plaintiffs objected to different sentences from the same paragraph and listed them separately with the same paragraph number. The Court will not rule on the individual evidentiary objections based on this procedural deficiency. Plaintiffs have objected to the entire Coleman Declaration on the basis that it is improper expert testimony because Coleman has not shown any special knowledge, skill, etc., related to billing for these types of cases pursuant to Evidence Code § 720. The Court has determined that Coleman has sufficiently demonstrated her special knowledge as a fee expert with this declaration and her recently submitted supplemental declaration. Plaintiffs objection to the entire Coleman Declaration is overruled. On April 9, 2024, a hearing was held on Plaintiffs motion for attorney fees. That same day, the Court issued a ruling on the submitted matter requesting that the parties submit additional briefing and that Plaintiffs submit invoices that do not redact the lawyers hourly rates or the amounts billed, along with supplemental points and authorities supporting their fee requests in light of that information. On May 24, 2024, Plaintiffs submitted their supplemental brief. In their brief, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should award standard hourly rates and that the fees sought for all tasks are reasonable. Plaintiffs submitted new billing records that still contain some redactions, but they do not redact the lawyers hourly rates or the amounts billed. On June 25, 2024, Defendants submitted their supplemental opposition brief. Defendants argue that the Court should significantly reduce the fees requested by Plaintiffs. Defendants also argue that the Court should consider Defendants expert declaration. Defendants also acknowledge that Plaintiffs conceded that the actual hourly rates and amounts billed are not privileged. ANALYSIS A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorneys fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See CCP § 1033.5(a)(10); Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a).) A successful party means a prevailing party, and [a party] may be considered prevailing parties for attorneys fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit. (Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 178.) Plaintiffs are the prevailing party by virtue of the fact that the parties settled in Plaintiffs favor via the 998 Offer. Plaintiffs have requested a total of $619,675 in attorney fees. Defendants previously opposed Plaintiffs motion on the basis that Plaintiffs agreed only to recover fees actually incurred and according to proof in the 998 Offer, and Defendants argued that Plaintiffs have not provided this proof. However, this argument was resolved with Plaintiffs supplemental brief, as Plaintiffs have now provided unredacted hourly rates and amounts billed. Plaintiffs attorney Christopher D. Beatty acknowledges in his supplemental declaration that the actual amount charged to the client was $543,156. (Beatty Supp. Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendants argue in their supplemental opposition that this should be the baseline from which any reductions in the requested amount should be made. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should only be able to recover fees actually incurred because that is what the 998 Offer between the parties allowed. (See San Dieguito Pship, L.P. v. San Dieguito River Valley Regl Open Spake Park Joint Powers Auth. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 910, disapproved on other grounds by PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084.) The Court agrees. Plaintiffs should only recover the fees actually incurred, which in this case is, at a maximum, $543,156. Next, Defendants contest the reasonableness of the fees incurred by Plaintiffs. In determining the reasonableness of fees, courts look to the factors from Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, disapproved on other grounds by Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68 n.5. The factors from Wollersheim are (1) the amount of money involved in the litigation; (2) the nature of the litigation and its difficulty and the intricacies and importance of the litigation; (3) the skill required and employed in handling the litigation, the necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the case, and counsels education and experience in the particular type of work involved; (4) the attention given to the case; (5) the success of the attorneys efforts; and (6) the time consumed by the litigation. (Id.) Plaintiffs argued in the initial motion that they met all of these factors. First, Plaintiffs argue that large amounts of money were involved in this litigation because of Ahangs cross-complaint for $7 million and the fact that the original settlement agreement divided the parties assets that were valued in excess of $20 million. Next, for the second factor, Plaintiffs argue that the nature of this case was an emotional case between two ex-spouses and business partners with significant assets at issue, and Ahang had been determined by the Court to have engaged in fraud. For the third factor, Plaintiffs argued that this was a complex case that required an experienced legal team to handle it, and Beattys team were the logical ones to handle it because Beatty had handled the cases that led to the settlement agreement. For the fourth factor, Plaintiffs argued that their counsel had to devote significant attention to this case. For the fifth factor, Plaintiffs argued that their counsel had success throughout the case in prevailing on the anti-SLAPP motion and defeating the attempt to disqualify Beatty, as well as being the prevailing party for the 998 Offer. Finally, for the sixth factor, Plaintiffs argued that this case consumed considerable time and went on for two years and would have gone on much longer if Hamid had not accepted the 998 Offer. Defendants argue that the attorney fee award should be reduced as the hours billed are excessively unreasonable. A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circ*mstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether. (Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 990-991(citing Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635).) This Court previously acknowledged in its tentative ruling the apparent excessive billing for several of Plaintiffs motions: the Anti-SLAPP Motion (160.5 hours), Opposition to Motion to Disqualify (96.5 hours), Demurrer (90.2 hours), Motion for Attorney fees re Anti-SLAPP Motion (49 hours), and Motion to Quash Summons (38.6 hours). This Court also suggested reducing the time spent on those motions by 25%. Defendants argue that they should be reduced by at least 60% because they are beyond excessive. Other specific tasks that Defendants argue were excessively billed were the 4.0 hours for a half-page notice of continuance; 12.1 hours for a subpoena with 8 document requests; 14.7 hours spent on two identical subpoenas with 6 document requests; 22.3 hours spent on 3 page ex parte application and 2 page declaration to advance a hearing date; 18.3 hours preparing for and drafting a mediation brief; and 10.3 hours on generic case analysis over 48 entries. Defendants argue that the Court should also take into account all of these minor issues in awarding the attorney fees. Defendants also argue that the at least 209.5 hours spent in relation to the Anti-SLAPP motion was beyond excessive and should be reduced by more than 25%. Defendants cite a case where the Court of Appeal affirmed a reduction in attorney fees and costs related to an Anti-SLAPP motion from $112,288.63 to just $23,000, with the Court of Appeal stating that claiming 200 hours of work & seems excessive and that such a motion should not have been such a monumental undertaking. (Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1248-1252.) Defendant Finally, Defendants argue that the Court should consider Defendants expert declaration because it would be admissible because the experts declaration included descriptions of her experience as a fee expert. (See Coleman Decl., ¶¶ 3-10, 14, and 15.) The Court previously sustained Plaintiffs objections to the Coleman Declaration, but in light of Defendants arguments and Colemans supplemental declaration, the Court will consider Colemans declaration. In light of all of the foregoing, the Court believes that some reduction of the requested fees is necessary. Both the previously indicated major issues and the minor issues that Defendants have brought to the attention of the Court should be reduced. The amount that the Court will start with is $543,156 in fees actually incurred. The Court previously considered reducing certain fees by 25%. Defendants request an across the board reduction of 60%, which would be $217,262 in fees awarded. Alternatively, Defendants request that the Court do an across the board reduction of 25%, since that percentage is what the Court previously found was appropriate. Based on both the major and minor issues with the billing records, the Court agrees that an across the board reduction is appropriate. The Court also finds that an across the board reduction of 25% is reasonable. That would make the fee award $407,367. The Court will award this amount. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that their attorneys hourly rates are rates are reasonable. Furthermore, this was a complex class requiring a lot of motion practice, particularly where the Anti-SLAPP motion is concerned. Plaintiffs have provided proof of the amount of time spent on the case through the now-unredacted billing statements. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs motion for attorney fees is granted in the amount of $407,367.00. Costs should be requested in a memorandum of costs. Moving party to give notice.

Ruling

1167 MISSION STREET, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED VS. IMAGE INTERIORS, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED ET AL

Jul 24, 2024 |CGC23609091

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 24, 2024 line 3. PLAINTIFF 1167 MISSION STREET, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND TO STRIKE IMAGE INTERIORS LLC'S ANSWER DUE TO SUSPENDED CORPORATE STATUS is OFF CALENDAR, moot. See July 10, 2023 Lee Declaration. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Ruling

BENIK, LLC VS BESPOKE GROUP INC.

Sep 18, 2024 |24PSCV01393

Case Number: 24PSCV01393 Hearing Date: September 18, 2024 Dept: 6 Plaintiff Benik, LLCs Request for Entry of Default Judgment Defendants: Bespoke Group, Inc., and all other tenants, subtenants, and occupants in possession COURT RULING Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice. BACKGROUND This is a commercial unlawful detainer action. On May 1, 2024, plaintiff Benik, LLC (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Bespoke Group, Inc. (Defendant) and Does 1 to 20, alleging the sole cause of action for unlawful detainer. On May 21, 2024, default was entered against Defendant and all other tenants, subtenants, and occupants in possession. On June 27, 2024, Plaintiff requested entry of default judgment. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has failed to timely respond or appear. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585.) A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursem*nts; (5) declaration of nonmilitary status; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.) ANALYSIS Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendant in the total amount of $391,597.71, including $67,169.72 in past-due rent, $97,314.56 in holdover damages, $1,115.84 in costs, and $225,997.59 in other damages. The Court finds Plaintiffs default judgment package has some issues. First, Plaintiffs holdover damages calculation is excessive. Holdover damages start from the day after the notice to quit period ends. (CACI 4340.) The Complaint alleges the notice period expired April 24, 2024. (Compl., ¶ 9.b.(1).) Thus, the calculations should begin April 25, 2024, not April 19, 2024. (UD-116, ¶ 12, subd. (c); Summary of Case, p. 2:13-14.) Second, Plaintiffs other damage calculation includes future rent and broker commissions, which are improper here. (UD-116, ¶ 24, subd. (b); Summary of Case, pp. 4-5.) It is well settled that damages allowed in unlawful detainer proceedings are only those which result from the unlawful detention and accrue during that time. [Citation.] (Vasey v. California Dance Co. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 742, 748, italics in original.) [T]he award of damages for breaches of the lease occurring before the unlawful detainer [citation] and of future damages for continued unlawful possession beyond the date of the judgment until such time as possession is returned to the landlord are not permitted in unlawful detainer. (Hudec v. Robertson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1156, 1163.) It is unclear if Plaintiff can even recover the $39,800 in free rent as past-due rent here since that arguably was not considered unpaid until a breach occurred. (See Compl., Ex. 1, ¶ 52; UD-116, ¶ 24, subd. (a); Summary of Case, p. 3.) If Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid rent for the remainder of the lease term or other remedies provided under the contract, such as the broker commissions or free rent, Plaintiff may pursue such matters in a separate civil action. (Vasey v. California Dance Co., supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at p. 748 fn. 2.) Finally, a default judgment for monetary damages can only be sought against the defendant. A default judgment for possession only may include all tenants, subtenants and occupants. (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 715.010, 1169.) CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice.

Ruling

KYLE A. PEREZ VS LOANCARE, LLC, A VIRGINIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.

Jul 26, 2024 |23CHCV01204

Case Number: 23CHCV01204 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: F47 Dept. F47 Date: 7/26/24 Case #23CHCV01204 MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL Motion filed on 3/22/24. MOVING ATTORNEY: Safora Nowrouzi CLIENT: Plaintiff Kyle A. Perez RELIEF REQUESTED: An order relieving Safora Nowrouzi as counsel for Plaintiff Kyle A. Perez in this action. RULING: The motion is granted. On 3/22/24, attorney Safora Nowrouzi filed and served the instant motion to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Kyle A. Perez (Plaintiff) in this action on the grounds the essential relationship of trust and confidence that underpins the attorney-client relationship has been irreparably compromised. (See Nowrouzi Decl. No.2). On 7/19/24, Plaintiff filed and served an opposition to the motion wherein Plaintiff admits that the relationship between he and attorney Nowrouzi has deteriorated due to disagreements over litigation strategy. (See Perez Decl. ¶6). Additionally, Plaintiff claims that attorney Nowrouzi has not diligently pursued [his] claims. Id. The motion also implies that Plaintiff believes he has a claim against attorney Nowrouzi for legal malpractice based on advice attorney Nowrouzi gave to Plaintiff regarding this case. (See Opposition, generally). Despite the foregoing, Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the motion and require attorney Nowrouzi to continue to represent him in this matter and during settlement negotiations claiming that he will be prejudiced if attorney Nowrouzi is permitted to withdraw because the case is at a critical stage of settlement negotiations. (Perez Decl. ¶¶7-8). Based on the declarations of attorney Nowrouzi and Plaintiff, it is clear that that there has been an irreparable breakdown in the attorney-client relationship which warrants relieving attorney Nowrouzi as Plaintiffs counsel in this matter. Plaintiff admits that he received notice of attorney Nowrouzis intention to withdraw on 4/2/24. (Perez Decl. ¶4). Therefore, Plaintiff has had almost 4 months to retain replacement counsel to assist him in this matter. Plaintiffs failure to do so does not justify denying the motion under the circ*mstances.

Ruling

AHLUWALIA, NIRMAL KUMAR vs KHACHO, ESAM - a)

Jul 24, 2024 |CV-22-003529

CV-22-003529 – AHLUWALIA, NIRMAL KUMAR vs KHACHO, ESAM - a) Plaintiffs’ Motion to be Relieved from Deemed Admissions (CCP 2033.300 (a)) - GRANTED, conditionally; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Continue or Dismiss Time-Barred Motion for Summary Judgment – MOOT.a) GRANTED, conditionally.The Court finds based on the totality of circ*mstances that Plaintiff’s Counsel’s cardiac condition, the medications for which Counsel states cause him to suffer drowsiness and severe head pain that adversely affect “his ability to think and reason” and negatively impacted his ability to timely respond to Defendant’s Requests for Admissions support a finding of excusable neglect by the Court in respect of said Request for Admissions. (Code of Civil Proc. § 2033.300; New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, rehearing denied, review denied).Defendant’s Requests for Admissions which were deemed admitted by the Court are accordingly hereby withdrawn. Plaintiffs are hereby granted leave to tender their proposed responses to said discovery instead.Plaintiff’s application is hereby granted subject to Defendant being granted leave to file an attorney fee motion in respect of Defendant’s pending motion for summary judgement. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2033.300 (c); Rhule v. WaveFront Tech., Inc., (2017) 8 Cal. App. 5th 1223).Furthermore, any discovery responses that remain outstanding on Plaintiff’s part shall be submitted to Defendant’s within fourteen 14 days of the date of this order.b) MOOT.In view of the Court’s ruling granting Plaintiffs relief from deemed admissions and granting them leave to file their proposed responses to Defendant’s Request for Admissions, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement, which is founded on said deemed admissions, is hereby rendered moot.Furthermore, the 30-day “cut-off” under CCP § 437c is measured from the trial date in effect when the summary judgment motion is made. Thus, a continuance of the initial trial date “reopens” the time for such motions. (Green v. Bristol Myers Co. (1988) 206 Cal.3d 604, 609; Soderberg v. McKinney (1996) 44 Cal.4th 1760, 1765; Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 10-C)THE COURT’S PHONE SYSTEM MAY BE DOWN.If you desire a hearing, you must email your request to civil.tentatives@stanct.org before 4:00 p.m. today. In addition, your email must list the email addresses of all counsel who will appear at the hearing.Please refer to the Stanislaus Superior Court website for call-ininstructions for the hearing. IfVCourtis unavailable the website will postZoom Meetingcredentials for Dept. 24. The hearing will proceed via Zoom if VCourt is still unavailable.

Ruling

DAVID ODAY, ET AL. VS 118 WADSWORTH AVENUE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.

Jul 29, 2024 |23STCV24766

Case Number: 23STCV24766 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 29, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: David Oday, et al. v. 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association, et al. CASE NO.: 23STCV24766 MOTION TO DISSOLVE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOVING PARTY: Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs David Oday and Lakota Patrick Ford CASE HISTORY: · 10/11/23: Complaint filed. · 01/10/24: First Amended Complaint filed. · 03/01/24: Cross-Complaint filed. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is a breach of contract and habitability defect action. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants refused to replace the roof of Plaintiffs condominium, causing extensive water damage and mold throughout the unit. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants improperly issued special assessments in violation of the operative covenants, conditions, and restrictions on the property, and retaliated against Plaintiffs for raising these issues. Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 because of Plaintiffs failure to post the bond required. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction is DENIED, as Plaintiff David Oday has served and filed an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). DISCUSSION: Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 because of Plaintiffs failure to post the bond required. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 533 states: In any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 533.) Modification of a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court upon a consideration of all the particular circ*mstances of each individual case. (Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage (1959) 52 Cal.2d 601, 606.) The party seeking modification has the burden of proving that the request is justified. (See Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1504.) Analysis Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to post the undertaking of $70,416.09 ordered by the Court. (See February 22, 2024 Minute Order.) Plaintiffs, in opposition, state that payment in the amount specified by the Courts order was deposited with the Court on June 26, 2024, with notice given to Defendant the next day. (Declaration of Scott J. Kalter ISO Opp. Exhs. 1-2.) In reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs deposit of the funds to the Court is effective as a posting of a bond under Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710, but only if the deposit is accompanied by an agreement executed by the principal authorizing the officer to collect, sell, or otherwise apply the deposit to enforce the liability of the principal on the deposit. (Code Civ. Proc. § 995.710(c).) Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have not executed such an agreement, and, therefore, that the injunction should be dissolved. The Court concurs with Defendant that an authorization to dispose of the funds to satisfy liability is required for Plaintiffs deposit to be considered posting of the bond under section 995.710. In response to the Courts prior tentative ruling, Plaintiff David Patrick Oday has submitted an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. CONCLUSION: Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction is DENIED given that Plaintiff David Patrick Oday has served and filed an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). Moving party to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 29, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

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CPI PALM TERRACE OWNER LLC vs FARAH, SOUHA

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WELLS FARGO BANK N A vs UNKNOWN HEIRS DEVISEES GRANTEES ASSIGNEES CREDITORS LIENORS AND TRUSTEES OF RICHELLE G FREGNAN AKA RICHELLE GAY FREGNAN FKA RICHELLE G BEERS FKA RICHELLE BEERS DECEASED AND ALL THER PERSONS CLAIMING BY AND THROUGH UNDER AGAINST THE NAMED DEFENDANTS

Jul 22, 2024 |UZABEL, MARYANN OLSON |COUNTY FORECLOSURE $30,001 to $50,000 |COUNTY FORECLOSURE $30,001 to $50,000 |2024 CC 004829 NC